T

A. Interpretation – The affirmative must affirm the topic instrumentally. The 1AC must include a topical plan that is justified with a normative defense of federal government adoption of such a policy.

B. Definitional Support:

1. The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon – the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2000

<http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

1. Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

1. The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

C. Violation – The affirmative is not an instrumental affirmation of the resolution – they affirm the topic as

D. Reasons to Prefer

1. Ground – Refusing to defend the implementation of the plan/resolution erases all predictable negative counterplan, disadvantage and case ground. While we may have arguments indicting the idea of the plan or personal advocacy, we’ll never have evidence saying their specific advocacy of the plan is bad. This eliminates all of our resolutionally-based offensive arguments.
2. Topical Education – By manipulating the topic to access a political project they destroy discussion of the important question asked by the resolution. This tactic promotes debate that is either stagnant or shallow
3. Extra Topicality – Even if they claim to “defend” their plan – they skirt discussion of its merits by arguing the benefits derived from their advocacy outweigh. This is a voting issue because we’re forced to win framework just to get back to equal footing – extra topicality also proves the resolution insufficient and explodes aff ground.
4. Bad Policymaking – The affirmative subverts discussion of the merits of specific policies, which negates our ability to compare the effects of the plan to the status quo. This ruins a critical function of this activity which is to test the desirability of policy implementation.

E. Voting Issue – If we demonstrate the affirmative does not meet the best interpretation of the topic they have failed to justify the resolution and should be rejected. This is the best way to preserve competitive equity by ensuring predictable ground for the negative.

And, without the ability to determine a topic of discussion, debate becomes impossible.

Ruth Lesl Shively, Professor of Politics at Texas A&M, 2000 [*Partisan Politics and Political Theory*, p. 181-2]

In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no agreement except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Registers, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Don’t let him K framework in his 2AC. Questioning current debate norms doesn’t change anything, only rejecting bad debate practices will.

CP

We advocate the entire 1AC minus the Aff advocacy. We disconnect the plan from the affirmative as an author. This allows us to break down the notions of causality, linearity, ownership, and stasis in the text and celebrate the infinite multiplicity and play of meaning.

Barthes ‘77

Roland Barthes. “The Death of the Author.” Image-Music-Text. 1977.

The removal of the Author (one could talk here with Brecht of a veritable ‘distancing’, the Author diminishing like a figurine at the far end of the literary stage) is not merely an historical fact or an act of writing; it utterly transforms the modern text (or — which is the same thing —the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all its levels the author is absent). The temporality is different. The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after. The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child. In complete contrast, the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now. The fact is (or, it follows) that writing can no longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, ‘depiction’ (as the Classics would say); rather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative a rare verbal form (exclusively given in the first person and in the present tense) in which the enunciation has no other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is uttered—something like the I declare of kings or the I sing of very ancient poets. Having buried the Author, the modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of his predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his thought or passion and that consequently, making a law of necessity, he must emphasize this delay and indefinitely ‘polish’ his form. For him, on the contrary, the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin—or which, at least, has no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins. We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. Similar to Bouvard and Pecuchet, those eternal copyists, at once sublime and comic and whose profound ridiculousness indicates precisely the truth of writing, the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them. Did he wish to express himself, he ought at least to know that the inner ‘thing’ he thinks to ‘translate’ is itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely; something experienced in exemplary fashion by the young Thomas de Quincey, he who was so good at Greek that in order to translate absolutely modern ideas and images into that dead language, he had, so Baudelaire tells us (in Paradis Artificiels), ‘created for himself an unfailing dictionary, vastly more extensive and complex than those resulting from the ordinary patience of purely literary themes’. Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred. Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty) beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is ‘explained’—victory to the critic. Hence there is no surprise in the fact that, historically, the reign of the Author has also been that of the Critic, nor again in the fact that criticism (be it new) is today undermined, along with the Author. In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be disentangled, nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, ‘run’ (like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing beneath: the space of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would bebetter from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases—reason, science, law.

**A) Our net benefit is the loss of ontology: we access this by destroying the traditional norms of thinking that inevitably lead to technological thought processes destroying all value to life.**

Stenstad 6 (Gail, Professor in the department of philosophy and humanities at East Tennessee State University, Transformations-Thinking after Heidegger, pg 186-187)

If we can succeed to a significant extent in releasement toward things, letting go of the things that constitute calculative, metaphysical thinking and letting go of the most powerful notions that have emerged from that thinking then openness to mystery,” already at work, can come even more to the fore. Releasement toward things is multifaceted, and, as it comes into play, it already begins to converge with openness to mystery. Why do I say that? Gathering up the “things” to be released and the sense of “releasing” engaged in each case will help answer that question. The phrase “releasement toward things” is ambiguous; that very ambiguity is part of its power in helping us engage the thinking of be-ing and open up what it might mean to dwell in timing-spacing-thinking. On the one hand, releasement means letting go of what blocks or hinders thinking and dwelling. On the other, releasement means releasing ourselves toward things, opening to them in a new way. What things are released in the first sense, and how are their releasements related to one another? 1. The traditional rules, norms, and expectations of what constitutes good thinking**:** conceptual grasping and fixing, method, theory, system. 2.The idea of “being” as something that is reified upon being conceptually lifted out and separated from beings. 3. The things that such traditional philosophizing begins form and works toward; arche and telos. Releasing the idea of being also releases the idea of its primary function: to serve as the ground of being and of thinking. Be-ing is ab-ground, and there is no arche, no first principle, to be found in its thinking. With no arche there is no telos, no ultimate end or aim that could somehow be attained in carrying out the thinking. 4. Therefore, the notion of “an ethics” is highly released along with other kinds of theorizing (metaphysics, epistemology). Dwelling cannot be constrained within the frameworks of ethics. 5. The various interpretation of “beings” that are grounded on some concept of “being.” This involves releasing such notions as substance (and the related philosophical notion of “accidents”), matter with its form, subject and object, and dualistically conceived mind and body. 6. the idea of ourselves as beings, conceived in any of the ways listed in point five. 7. And finally, the one that Heidegger himself gives when he first speaks of releasement toward things in “memorial Address,” letting go of our entrapped fascination with the products of techno-calculative thinking, including taking language as merely information or entertainment. When Heidegger first suggested that releasement toward things was a step toward being able to learn to think in a way that was not just calculative, he described it as being able to say both “yes” and “no” to technical devices. Releasement toward things does not mean flat rejection. In the case of the things indicated in point seven they can be used or not used. What is released is the sense that they are somehow necessary; they become optional. This “yes” and “no,” indicating the optional character of what is released has a bearing on all the other items on my list, too, and we can examine each of them in that light.

**B) Their understanding of knowledge is based in a Cartesian ontology which seeks to reduce and enframe everything it encounters, constituting a veritable war on Being**

Swazo 2 (Norman, Philosophy—University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 2002, Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, p.98-100)

In short, with Descartes’ metaphysical position all fundamental positions of subjectivity are enabled and initiated, having their effective manifestation in the political domain (notwithstanding the role traditionally assigned to Machiavelli and Hobbes as “founders” of modern political philosophy). Already with Descartes there is posited the metaphysical ground of a subjective egoism having the world for its proper object; and it is the Cartesian metaphysic that enables a universalist politics coordinate with the self-given task of scrutiny, conquest, mastery, and disposition of the whole of being (hence the enlightenment practical philosophy of Kant and the philosophes—and the rational project of the Enlightenment itself as a political project). The metaphysical dispensation inaugurated by Descartes effectively transforms the conception of world order from the medieval “order of creation” to that of the modern “order of reason” having its basis in “the subjectivity of man’s essence”: It is on this basis that, as Heidegger said in the “Letter on Humanism,” all objects may “be planned by means of worldly reason (Weltvernunft) which supplies the law for itself and thus also claims that its procedure is immediately intelligible (what is considered logical).We can now understand—in the context of world order thinking—Heidegger’s remarks cited earlier concerning “the quiescence of happening” that belongs to the essential history of the West as the history of Being epochally given in the history of metaphysics. Specifically, we can see how a “basic form of its presence,” viz., Descartes’ fundamental metaphysical position, yet governs today. In Descartes’ fundamental metaphysical position, as the articulation of an epochal formation or configuration of thought, word, and deed, in the history of Being, ‘being’ as ‘representedness’ is that ruling understanding of being which is given to thinking. Things in general are understood to be what they are according to their delimitation as represented beings. This ruling understanding holds true *in its employment* with respect to the conception of human being understood as *res cogitans* and to the conception of the totality of things that make up the external world, understood in the category of res exensae. The human being as preeminent subject, being as representedness, truth as certitude, and man as measure—these basic metaphysical categories inform thinking and doing in the historical period of which Descartes is the essential thinker (its “herald,” as it were). To use Heidegger’s words, we must understand Descartes’ metaphysics as the ground of the “essential formation” (Wesensgestalt) taking place. The Cartesian metaphysical position serves to articulate a fundamental “repetition” of a formative attack on the whole of being. This means that the creative force of this “formative” oreientation is not limited to Descartes himself as a public personality, i.e., as one among others participating in “cultural activity.” Rather, the full creative force of this repetition is expressed in the word and deed of poets, thinkers, statesment, artists, etc., who are more or less contemporary in the “transition” from the medieval to the modern dispensation. It is through the fullness of this creative force that the repetition is at the same time a transformation of the world. Thus, the world that comes into being, the essential formation, is manifest in the contemporaneous expression of all such figures—precisely in the manner in which there is involvement with beings and their designation is secured in a way consonant to the Cartesian metaphysical component.

**C) This focus on knowledge production and assessment overwhelms the search for transformative realities through its fundamental grounding in modern science—this obliterates the possibility of politics—straight turns their argument. Meaning that their aff literally has no solvency making all their advantages disads to the status quo which the counter plan solves for.**

Swazo 2 (Norman, Philosophy—University of Alaska, Fairbanks, **2002,** Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, p.138)

Cavaille adds, however, that Descartes himself “returns to this analogy to affirm in substance that it is impossible to derive good politics from true science and that nothing in the political realm is more detestable than utopia. In short, that philosophy and politics, whatever analogical relationships may be possible, are incommensible.” Yet, as Cavaille remarks concerning “the dialectic of political utopia” in interaction with “the specifically Cartesian attitude”—and here we must think systems science—there is in Descartes’ analogy an illumination of “certain fundamental aspects of the relationships that modern science since its origins has maintained with politics.” Thus: Philosophical discourse creates a space for political utopia, as a correct analogy for science, even if this space for political utopia in the Cartesian text is immediately filled in, rejected covered over by the utopia of science. The disavowed utopia remains one of the potential results of Cartesian science, first of all because it is an integral part of the referential apparatus through which the modern episteme acquired its definition. Utopia, in other words, is one of the founding myths of science. Once it has been established, science rejects the images and dreams out of which it was born (and the Cartesian text is exemplary from this point of view), but utopia reappears recurringly in history, as a political project justified through science. Because political utopia is itself one of the models for nascent science, it can then take as model victorious science….[T]he specifically Cartesian attitude, which aims at rejection utopia a priori and with it every form of politics as a production of science, is even more paradigmatic of modern scientificity. For the true utopia of science consists, perhaps, in its secret desire to supplant politics, to substitute itself for it…[emphasis added] Systems theory, and thus in particular the systems approach to the future of the world order, viewed in its continuity with “the specifically Cartesian attitude,” becomes nothing less than a tacit “denigration of politics**” –**an attempt “to dissolve it into the quantitative uniformity of its mathematical universality.” Cavaille speaks all to aptly when he says: “The arrival of the utopia of science necessarily coincides with the end of politics**.”**

## **K #1**

### **You are no longer the judge in this round because the affirmative has taken your position determining and creating the guidelines for your evaluation at the end of this debate determining only one way in which you can make your decision and only one way in which we can ground our discussions of the world’s issues. It is the oppressors who act upon the people of the world to adjust them to a single reality only corresponding to their view of the world, instead of that of the people. In this sense the 1ac’s ballot becomes a single worldview and not that of the people. Forcing us to become trapped by the positivist notions of the banking line.**

**Paulo** Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Chapter 1, educator and director of the Department of Cultural Extension of Recife University,**19**70

For the truly humanist educator and the authentic revolutionary, the object of action is the reality to be transformed by them together with other people — not other men and women themselves. The oppressors are the ones who act upon the people to indoctrinate them and adjust them to a reality which must remain untouched. Unfortunately**,** however, in their desire to obtain the support of the people for revolutionary action, revolutionary leaders often fall for the banking line of planning program content from the top down. They approach the peasant or urban masses with projects which may correspond to their own view of the world, but not to that of the people.[10] They forget that their fundamental objective is to fight alongside the people for the recovery of the people’s stolen humanity, not to “win the people over” to their side. Such a phrase does not belong in the vocabulary of revolutionary leaders, but in that of the oppressor The revolutionary’s role is to liberate, and be liberated, with the people — not to win them over. In their political activity, the dominant elites utilize the banking concept to encourage passivity in the oppressed, corresponding with the latter’s “submerged” state of consciousness, and take advantage of that passivity to “fill” that consciousness with slogans which create even more fear of freedom. This practice is incompatible with a truly liberating course of action, which, by presenting the oppressor’s slogans as a problem, helps the oppressed to “eject” those slogans from within themselves. After all the task of the humanists is surely not that of pitting their slogans against the slogans of the oppressors, with the oppressed as the testing ground, “housing” the slogans of first one group and then the other. On the contrary, the task of the humanists is to see that the oppressed become aware of the fact that as dual beings, “housing” the oppressors within themselves, they cannot be truly human. This task implies that revolutionary leaders do not go to the people in order to bring them a message of “salvation,” but in order to come to know through dialogue with them both their objective situation and their awareness of that situation — the various levels of perception of themselves and of the world in which and with which they exist. One cannot expect positive results from an educational or political action program which fails to respect the particular view of the world held by the people. Such a program constitutes cultural invasion,[11]good intentions notwithstanding

And it is from their panoptic approach that we find the controlling mechanism of argumentation presented in the 1AC when they demand that their world-view of debate be adopted … specifically when they say they “just want to have fun” and “be free.” It is this creation of community from being in common and single paradigm cognition where we commit the community we call upon to the tomb.

Nancy in 1986 (Jean-Luc, The Inoperable Community. Pg. xxxviii-xli)

Finitude, or the infinite lack of infinite identity, if we can risk such a forumulation, is what makes community. That is, community is made or is formed by the retreat or by the subtraction of something: this something, which would be the fulfilled infinite identity of community, is what I call its “work.” All our political programs imply this work: either as the product of the working community, or else the community itself as work. But in fact it is the work that the community does not do and that it is not that forms community. In the work, the properly “common” character of community disappears, giving way to a unicity and a substantiality. (The work itself, in fact, should not be understood primarily as the exteriority of a product, but as the interiority of the subject’s operation.) The community that becomes a single thing (body, mind, fatherland, Leader…) necessarily loses the in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or the together that defines it. It yields its being-together to a being of togetherness. The truth of community, on the contrary, resides in the retreat of such a being. Community is made of what retreats from it: the hypostasis of the “common,” and its work. The retreat opens, and continues to keep open, this strange being-the-one-with-the-other to which we are exposed. (Nothing indicates more clearly what the logic of this being of togetherness can imply than the role of Gemeinschaft, of community, in Nazi ideology.) If I had to attempt to state the principle guiding the analyses in these texts, I might do so by saying this: community does not consist in the transcendence (nor in the transcendental) of a being supposedly immanent to community. It consists on the contrary in the immanence of a “transcendence”- that of finite existence as such, which is to say, of its “exposition.” Exposition, precisely, is not a “being” that one can “sup-pose” (like a sub-stance) to be in community. Community is presuppositionless: this is why it is haunted by such ambiguous ideas as foundation and sovereignty, which are at once ideas of what would be completely suppositionless and ideas of what would always be presupposed. But community cannot be presupposed. It is only exposed. This is undoubtedly not easy to think. But such thinking, which is perhaps inaccessible (inaccessible without the being-in-common of thinking, without the sharing of reading, without the politics within which all writing and reading are inscribed), forms a point of convergence and solidarity among the studies here dedicated to community properly speaking, to myth, to love, and to the retreat of the divine. By inverting the “principle” stated a moment ago, we get totalitarianism. By ignoring it, we condemn the political to management and to power (and to the management of power, and to the power of management). By taking it as a rule of analysis and thought, we raise the question: how can the community without essence (the community that is neither “people” nor “nation,” neither “destiny” nor “generic humanity,” etc.) be presented as such? That is, what might a politics be that does not stem from the will to realize an essence? I shall not venture into the possible forms of such a politics, of this politics that one might call the politics of the political, if the political can be taken as the moment, the point, or the event of being-in-common. This would be beyond my competence. But I do enter into the bond (not only the “social bond,” as one says today, all too readily, but the properly political bond) that binds the political, or in which the political is bound up. When I speak, in the studies that follow, of “literature,” of a “voice of interruption,” of “shattered” love, of “coming,” of “joy,” and finally of “places” of “dislocation,” it is always of the same bond that I shall be speaking: of a bond that forms ties without attachment, or even less fusion, of a bond that unbinds by binding, that reunites through the infinite exposition of an irreducible finitude. How can we be receptive to the meaning of our multiple,

dispersed, mortally fragmented existences, which nonetheless only makes sense by existing in common? In other words, perhaps: how do we communicate? But this question can be asked seriously only if we dismiss all “theories of communication,” which begin by positing the necessity or the desire for a consensus, a continuity and a transfer of messages. It is not a question of establishing rules for communication, it is a question of understanding before all else that in “communication” what takes place is an exposition: finite existence exposed to finite existence, co-appearing before it and with it. To think this point, or rather this limit that exposition “is,” is necessarily to think the point or the limit at which the moment of revolution presents itself. The idea of revolution has perhaps still not been understood, inasmuch as it is the idea of a new foundation or that of a reversal

of sovereignty. Of course, we need gestures of foundation and reversal. But their reason lies elsewhere: it is in the incessantly present moment at which existence-in-common resists every transcendence that tries to absorb it, be it in an All or in and Individual (in a Subject in general). This moment cannot be “founded,” and no foundation, therefore, can be “reversed” in it. This moment- when the in of the “in-common” erupts, resists, and disrupts the relations of need and force- annuls collective and communal hypostases; this violent and troubling moment resists murderous violence and the turmoil of fascination and identification: the intensity of the word “revolution” names it well, a word that, undoubtedly, has been bequeathed or delegated to us by an ambiguous history, but whose meaning has perhaps still to be revolutionized. One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up to such questions, the political will soon desert us completely, if it has not already done so. It will abandon us to political and technological economies, if it has not already done so. And this will be the end of our communities, if this has not yet come about. Being-in-common will nonetheless never cease to resist, but its resistance will belong decidedly to another world entirely. Our world, as far as politics is concerned, will be a desert, and we will wither away without a tomb- which is to say, without community, deprived of our finite existence.

While an embracement of their knowledge is diffidently a good thing the our issue is with the production of the knowledge and attempts of framing the debate round solely around a single worldview marginalizes the diversity of knowledge that comes from the otherized positions in the world.

KINCHELOE 2005(,Joe,professor of education at CUNY graduate center urban education program and at Brooklyn college from the book critical constructivism) Pg. 9: In constructivist theory, different individuals coming from diverse backgrounds will see the world in different ways. Imagine, for example, how a German bank teller, an Igbo tribesperson, a Texas rancher and women from a small village in China close to the Mongolian border might describe a major league baseball game. It is safe to assume that the descriptions would be quite different and even humorous to individuals who have understood the intricacies of the game since they were very young. There is no question that the backgrounds and expectations of the observer shape perception. Consider how a classroom is perceived by a class clown, a traditionally good student, a burnt-out teacher, a standardized test maker, an anti-standards activist, a bureaucratic supervisor, a disgruntled parent, a nostalgic alumnus or a student with feelings similar to the shooters, Eric and Dylan from Columbine High School. The way our psychosocial dispositions shape how the world is perceived holds important implications for teaching and critical thinking. Each of our students brings a unique disputation into the classroom. Indeed earth teacher carries a unique disposition with her or him.

**This is a criticism of prevailing methods for knowledge production, yes the affirmative might criticize the way in which western Eurocentric knowledge production has placed itself over society and controlled our interactions in the world, they take the process too far by replacing the harms and dominant epistemology of the status quo with the prevailing method of the 1ac.**

Joe L. Kincheloe 2008 (the Canada Research Chair in Critical Pedagogy in the Faculty of Education at McGill University. (contact the author at jkincheloe@aol.com )) “Knowledge and Critical Pedagogy: An Introduction” (our copy was printed on acid free paper) P37-38

Critical epistemology understands that knowing in a complex and ethical sense always understands knowledge is more opaque than Western science originally believed. Language is much too ambiguous to provide some clear reflection of the nature of the reality that surrounds us. Indeed, it is with these understandings and the additional recognition that it is the human who knows and produces knowledge that we move away from the blinders of FIDUROD. Knowledge in this critical epistemological context does not come directly from things in the world. The notion that knowledge comes to us without the filter of our socially constructed consciousness is one of the great fallacies of traditional Western science and FIDUROD. All knowledge runs through the subjectivity of human perception—without this step in the process what we understand as knowledge simply doesn’t exist. When we read a poet’s rendition of fog along the coastline of British Columbia, we are not reading a simple reflection of what the fog is. Instead, we are reading how the fog is interpreted by the consciousness of the poet. Move this notion into your own consciousness. How would you describe fog? What images of it come in to your mind as you consider it? Do you think those impressions are the same as peoples from other places and times? Is it possible that you have a lot to learn about fog from these diverse perspectives? Could it be that you might never think of fog in the same way after encountering some of these perspectives? What is your rela- tionship to fog? At the moment we recognize the socially constructed and interpretive dimension of a phenomenon such as fog, the cosmos gives birth to epistemology. Epistemology rushes through the conceptual birth canal at the exact instant we realize that humans don’t possess some immediate and straightforward access to knowledge. It’s far more complicated, and as we change the diaper of the epistemological infant we embark on a new journey to appreciate the mystery, grandeur, complexity, and ambiguity of this conundrum we call existence. If you have all the answers to questions about this mystifying dimension of being, then burn this book immediately— you don’t need it. The prevailing epistemology of the day—or as Michel Foucault labeled it, the episteme—insidiously fashions what we believe to be real and how we might come to know it (Foucault, 1990; May, 1993; Inayatullah, 1995). For example, is a metaphor real? Is an interpretation of history real? Is a relationship between being a hip hop artist and being a great teacher real? The answer, of course, rests in which epistemological baby we claimed as our own. In *Knowledge*  *and Critical Pedagogy: An Introduction* I’m trying to feed that restless, needy, and earsplitting epistebaby. One of the reasons that caring for the epistebaby is so important in twenty-first century society involves the politics of epistemology and pedagogy. Central to every page of Knowledge *and Critical Pedagogy: An Introduction* is the political understanding that contemporary dominant power uses FIDUROD’s scientific capital to do bad things—thank you for smoking, if you will. “Our experts have concluded after conducting rigorous scientific research that Exxon is doing no harm to the environment. The data just do not support the accusation of these radical environ- mental groups.” “After examining the contaminated area, the scientists employed at Monsanto Chemicals—excuse me, we changed our name to Solutia Inc.—have determined Solutia is not responsible for the cancer cluster in the county. Have a good day.” “How do we fight the scientific experts?” victims of corporate social irresponsibility ask. Scientific experts are expensive, poor and even middle/upper- middle class citizens can’t just go out and hire their own. We can begin to see why knowledge is power..

Instead of answering the worlds problems with the standardized fill in the blank answer the affirmative provides you for your ballot, you can vote neg in order to embrace the reconstructive imperative that instead formulates questions about the world without a limited amount of standardized set answers.

Our alternative will be two fold

First is the rejection of a prevailing brand of knowledge production, which fuels the banking concepts that standardize our education and actions.

And second – is the embracing of critical constructivism, which is the refusal to create action, debate, communication and community, based around a singular normative ideology.

THIS IS CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Kincheloein2005 (Joe, from the book Critical constructivism pg. 15 Uncovering elitist assumptions in the construction of knowledge)

With this reconstructive imperative in mind one of the central tasks of a critical constructivist teacher-scholar is to formulate questions that expose the conditions that promote social and educational advantage and disadvantage (Brosio, 1994, 200). For example it is obvious to many that when the methods of evaluation of advocates of the competitive top down standards of curriculum are employed, some non white and working class students do not generally do well. Their performance is interrupted as manifestation of slowness, of inferior ability. Researchers devise tests to evaluate school, student and teacher performance, forgetting throughout the process that evaluation is based on uncritically grounded constructions of intelligence and performance. Critical constructivists know that the advantage of subjugated perspectives, the view from below, involves what has been termed the “double consciousness” of the oppressed. If they are to survive, subjugated groups need to develop an understanding of who control them (e.g., slaves’ insight into the manners, eccentricities and fears of their masters). At the same time they are cognizant of the everyday mechanisms of oppression and the way such technologies shape their consciousness, their lived realities. Because of their privileged class, race and gender positions, many educators are insulated from the benefits of double consciousness of the subjugated and are estranged from a visceral appreciation of suffering (Zappulla,1997). Contemporary social organization, thus, is viewed from a lens that portrays (constructs) it as acceptable

Case/Solvency?

Like Society Debate is defined by its outsiders – it’s impossible to have an identity without an other. Liam’s attempt to bring the excluded into the center of the debate society destroys the other and makes all of society the outsider, collapsing the entire social realm.

Baudrillard in 81 [Jean, “Simulacra and Simulation” p. 143-147]

Thus the remainder refers to much more than a clear division in two localized terms, to a turning and reversible structure, an always imminent structure of reversion, in which one never knows which is the remainder of the other: In no other structure can one create this reversion, or this mise-en-abyme: the masculine is not the feminine of the feminine, the normal is not the crazy of the crazy; the right is not the left of the left, etc. Perhaps only in the mirror can the question be posed: which, the real or the image, is the reflection of the other? In this sense one can speak of the remainder as a mirror, or of the mirror of the remainder. It is that in both cases the line of structural demarcation, the line of the sharing of meaning, has become a wavering one, it is that meaning (most literally: the possibility of going from one point to an- other according to a vector determined by the respective position of the terms) no longer exists. There is no longer a respective position-the real disappearing to make room for an image, more real than the real, and conversely-the remainder disappearing from the assigned location to resurface inside out, in what it was the remainder of, etc. The same is true of the social. Who can say if the remainder of the social is the residue of the nonsocialized, or if it is not the social itself that is the remainder, the gigantic waste product. . . of what else? Of a process, which even if it were to completely disappear and had no name except the social would nevertheless only be its remainder. The residue can be completely at the level of the real. When a system has absorbed everything, when one has added everything up, when nothing remains, the entire sum turns to the remainder and becomes the remainder. Witness the "Society" column of Le Monde, in which paradoxically; only immigrants, delinquents, women, etc. appear- everything that has not been socialized, "social" cases analogous to pathological cases. Pockets to be reabsorbed, segments that the "social" isolates as it grows. Designated as "residual" at the horizon of the social, they enter its jurisdiction in this way and are destined to find their place in an enlarged sociality. It is for this remainder that the social machine is recharged and finds new energy; But what happens when everything is sponged up, when everything is socialized? Then the machine stops, the dynamic is reversed, and it is the whole social system that becomes residue. As the social in its progression eliminates all the residue, it itself becomes residual. In designating residual categories as "Society," the social designates itself as a remainder: The impossibility of determining what is the remainder of the other characterizes the phase of simulation and the death throes of distinctive systems, a phase when everything becomes a remainder and a residual. Inversely; the disappearance of the fatidic and structural slash that isolated the rest of ? ? ? and that now permits each term to be the remainder of the other term characterizes a phase of reversibility during which there is "virtually" no more remainder: The two propositions are simultaneously "true" and are not mutually exclusive. They are themselves reversible. Another aspect as surprising as the absence of an opposing term: the remainder makes you laugh. Any discussion on this theme unleashes the same language games, the same ambiguity, and the same obscenity as do discussions of sex or death. Sex and death are the great themes recognized for unleashing ambivalence and laughter. But the remainder is the third, and perhaps the only one, the two others amounting to this as to the very figure of reversibility. For why does one laugh? One only laughs at the reversibility of things, and sex and death are eminently reversible figures. It is because the stake is always reversible between masculine and feminine, between life and death, that one laughs at sex and death. How much more, then, at the remainder, which does not even have an opposing term, which by itself traverses the whole cycle, and runs infinitely after its own slash, after its own double, like Peter Schlemihl after his shadow? The remainder is obscene, because it is reversible and is exchanged for itself. It is obscene and makes one laugh, as only the lack of distinction between masculine and feminine, the lack of distinction between life and death makes one laugh, deeply laugh. Today, the remainder has become the weighty term. It is on the remainder that a new intelligibility is founded. End of a certain logic of distinctive oppositions, in which the weak term played the role of the residual term. Today, everything is inverted. Psychoanalysis itself is the first great theorization of residues (lapses, dreams, etc.). It is no longer a political economy of production that directs us, but an economic politics of reproduction, of recycling-ecology and pollution-a political economy of the remainder. All normality sees itself today in the light of madness, which was nothing but its insignificant remainder. Privilege of all the remainders, in all domains, of the not-said, the feminine, the crazy; the marginal, of excrement and waste in art, etc. But this is still nothing but a sort of inversion of the structure, of the return of the repressed as a powerful moment, of the return of the remainder as surplus of meaning, as excess (but excess is not formally different from the remainder, and the problem of the squandering of excess in Bataille is not different from that of the reabsorption of remainders in a political economy of calculation and penury: only the philosophies are different), of a higher order of meaning starting with the remainder. The secret of all the "liberations" that play on the hidden energies on the other side of the slash. Now we are faced with a much more original situation: not that of the pure and simple inversion and promotion of remainders, but that of an instability in every structure and every opposition that makes it so that there is no longer even a remainder; due to the fact that the remainder is everywhere, and by playing with the slash, it annuls itself as such. It is not when one has taken everything away that nothing is left, rather, nothing is left when things are unceasingly shifted and addition itself no longer has any meaning. Birth is residual if it is not symbolically revisited through initiation. Death is residual if it is not resolved in mourning, in the collective celebration of mourning. Value is residual if it is not reibsorbed and volitalized in the cycle of exchanges. Sexuality is residual once it becomes the production of sexual relations. The social itself is residual once it becomes a production of social relations." All of the real is residual, and everything that is residual is destined to repeat itself indefinitely in phantasms. All accumulation is nothing but a remainder, and the accumulation of remainders, in the sense that it is a rupture of alliance, and in the linear infinity of accumulation and calculation, in the linear infinity of production, compensates for the energy and value that used to be accomplished in the cycle of alliance. Now, what traverses a cycle is completely realized, whereas in the dimension of the infinite, everything that is below the line of the infinite, below the line of eternity (this stockpile of time that itself is also, as with any stockpile, a rupture of alliances), all of that is nothing but the remainder. Accumulation is nothing but the remainder, and repression is nothing but its inverse and asymmetrical form. It is on the stockpile of repressed affects and representations that our new alliance is based. But when everything is repressed, nothing is anymore. We are not far from this absolute point of repression where the stockpiles are themselves undone, where the stockpiles of phantasms collapse.

This radical opposition to the system affirms its existence. The Aff’s opposing discourses allow the system to simulate its own death and delay its collapse.

Baudrillard in 81 [Jean, “Simulacra and Simulation” p. 18-19]

Conjunction of the system and of its extreme alternative like the two sides of a curved mirror, a "vicious" curvature of a political space that is henceforth magnetized, circularized, reversibilized from the right to the left, a torsion that is like that of the evil spirit of commutation, the whole system, the infinity of capital folded back on its own surface: transfinite? And is it not the same for desire and the libidinal space? Conjunction of desire and value, of desire and capital. Conjunction of desire and the law, the final pleasure as the metamorphosis of the law (which is why it is so widely the order of the day): only capital takes pleasure, said Lyotard, before thinking that we now take pleasure in capital. Overwhelming versatility of desire in Deleuze, an enigmatic reversal that brings desire "revolutionary in itself, and as if involuntarily, wanting what it wants," to desire its own repression and to invest in paranoid and fascist systems? A malign torsion that returns this revolution of desire to the same fundamental ambiguity as the other, the historical revolution. All the referentials combine their discourses in a circular, Mobian compulsion. Not so long ago, sex and work were fiercely opposed terms; today both are dissolved in the same type of demand. Formerly the discourse on history derived its power from violently opposing itself to that of nature, the discourse of desire to that of power-today they exchange their signifiers and their scenarios.

It would take too long to traverse the entire range of the operational negativity of all those scenarios of deterrence, which, like Watergate, try to regenerate a moribund principle through simulated scandal, phantasm, and murder-a sort of hormonal treatment through negativity and crisis. It is always a question of moving the real through the imaginary, proving truth through scandal, proving the law through transgression, proving work through striking, proving the system through crisis, and capital through revolution, as it is elsewhere (the Tasaday) of proving ethnology through the dispossession of its object-without taking into account:

the proof of theater through antitheater;

the proof of art through antiart;

the proof of pedagogy through antipedagogy;

the proof of psychiatry through antipsychiatry, etc.

Everything is metamorphosed into its opposite to perpetuate itself in its expurgated form. All the powers, all the institutions speak of themselves through denial, in order to attempt, by simulating death, to escape their real death throes. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy Such was the case with some American presidents: the Kennedys were murdered because they still had a political dimension. The others, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, only had the right to phantom attempts, to simulated murders. But this aura of an artificial menace was still necessary to conceal that they were no longer anything but the mannequins of power. Formerly, the king (also the god) had to die, therein lay his power. Today, he is miserably forced to feign death, in order to preserve the blessing of power. But it is lost. To seek new blood in its own death, to renew the cycle through the mirror of crisis, negativity; and antipower: this is the only solution-alibi of every power, of every institution attempting to break the vicious circle of its irresponsibility and of its fundamental nonexistence, of its already seen and of its already dead.

Speaking out against current debate norms is playing into the hands of the system they criticize, because it is intended to maximize speech without creating change. We need to engage the system through passive resistance, not active opposition. This is the only way to rob the system of meaning.

Baudrillard in 81 [Jean, “Simulacra and Simulation” p. 84-86]

With one caution. We are face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind – exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to constitute them selves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand he responds with a double strategy; To the demand of being an object he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject he opposes, just as obstinately, and efficaciously, an object's resistance, that is to say, exactly the opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total dependence, passivity, idiocy: Neither strategy has more objective value than the other. The subject-resistance is today unilaterally valorized and viewed as positive-just as in the political sphere only the practices of freedom, emancipation, expression, and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable and subversive. But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning-precisely the practices of the masses-that we bury under the derisory terms of alienation and passivity. The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of voting, producing, deciding, speaking, participating, playing the game-a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood. But this strategy is more reflective of the earlier phase of the system, and even if we are still confronted with it, it is no longer the strategic terrain: the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and of the spoken word-or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non- reception. It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to re-turning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. This strategy (if one can still speak of strategy) prevails today, because it was ushered in by that phase of the system which prevails.

To choose the wrong strategy is a serious matter. All the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation, on the resurrection of a subject of history, of the group, of the word based on "consciousness raising," indeed a "raising of the unconscious" of subjects and of the masses, do not see that they are going in the direction of the system, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech.